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Abstract: This paper has constructed a programming model used to solve the optimal relative 
performance contracts. Under the contract that the constraints of the model can be satisfied, the 
strategy combination that the investors wish to see must form a Nash equilibrium in the managers’ 
subgame. It is further indicated by the numerical example that more often than not this equilibrium 
constitutes a dominant strategic equilibrium as long as the managers do not collaborate with each 
other. 
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relative . Sous le contrat que les contraites de modèle peuvent être satisfaites ,  la combinaison 
stratégique que souhaitent les investisseurs doit former un équilibre Nash dans les sub-jeux des 
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stratégie dominante , pourvu que les directeurs ne se collaborent pas . 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
With the development of Chinese securities market, the 
industry of investment funds has been growing up 
rapidly. By the end of first quarter of 2004, total 
investment in funds under management has reached 
more than ￥214 billion, which account for 11% of the 
market value of securities tradable volume in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Undoubtedly, the 
industry is playing an increasing important role in 
Chinese securities market.  
However, those funds managed by experts failed to 
achieve satisfying results. For instance, the closed-end 
fund has suffered loss added up to￥0.98 billion in 2003. 
Nevertheless, the fund companies still gain fat profits 
because of monopolization. This fact has not only given 
rise to much controversy over the reasonableness of 
fixed fee scheme practiced in investment fund industry, 
but also urged the necessity for designing a set of 
effective incentive schemes to rationalize the fee 
structure by which managers are compensated. 
The investor- fund manager relationship can be 
characterized as a principle-agent relationship in which 
the investor (principle) who is endowed with capital but 
no information delegates their investment decision to a 
manager (agent) who is endowed with 
information-gathering abilities. Since it is prohibitively 
costly for the investor to monitor his fund manager, it is 
quite likely for the manager to ignore his responsibility 
of collecting information to save effort unless the 
investor offers a reasonable incentive contract that 
provides the proper incentives. 
Most previous work (Starks, L., 1987; Grinold, R. 
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and A.Rudd, 1987; Cohen, S. and Starks, L., 1988) on 
the incentives of fund managers compared the 
performance of a fund manager with that of a passive 
benchmark, few research has focused on the problem of 
designing a relative performance contract based on 
performance comparison between different managers. 
Since it is really a promising research subject, it appeals 
to many researchers recently, among which are Heinkel 
and Stoughton(1994), Steven Huddart (1999) and Jü
rgen Eichberger (1999). 
Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) and Steven Huddart 
(1999) examine the effect of reputation and 
performance fee on fund manager’s portfolio choice, 
under the condition that one manager is strictly better 
informed than the other. 
On the assumption that each manager’s signal is 
informative and their signals are relative, J ü rgen 
Eichberger et al (1999) design a relative performance 
contract (abbreviated to EGK model) based on 
comparison of two managers’ performance. They 
conclude that if two managers of different funds both 
accept contracts that depend on their relative as well as 
absolute performances, then there may exist equilibria 
in the managers’ subgame that result in undesirable 
outcomes for the owners. The fund owner who offers 
relative performance contracts can exploit the extra 
benefits only if the other owner offers non-relative 
performance contracts. But the reason why such 
conclusion is drawn is that the constraints of their model 
are not thorough, which cause a flaw in the contract that 
the managers can exploit. What’s more, they didn’t 
show how managers’ compensation is related to asset 
size, it seems that the optimal contract is independent of 
asset size, the manager will receive the same payment 
no matter how many money has been under their control. 
It is obviously unreasonable. First, it is contrary to the 
business practice where the compensations of fund 
managers are often stipulated as a percentage of assets 
under management. Second, managing assets of 
different size often require different effort exertion. 
Therefore, the remuneration of fund managers should 
be relevant to asset size. 
In view of above reasons, this paper constructs a 
programming model used to solve the optimal relative 
performance contract, under which the strategy 
combination that the investors wish to see must form a 
Nash equilibrium in the managers’ subgame. Like EGK 
model, our model characterizes the interaction among 
two fund owners and their respective managers. It is 
common knowledge that the two managers are equally 
informed about the future returns of a risky asset. But 
our model differs from   those of Eichberger et al at least 
in two ways. First, our model chooses not the absolute 
payment but the compensation fee as the endogenous 
variable. As discussed above, this arrangement 
conforms to business practice. Second, while EGK 
model assumes investors are risk-neutral and managers 
are risk- averse described by a special utility function, in 
our model both investors and managers are considered 
risk-averse denoted by a general CRRA utility function, 
which have more extensive implications without loss of 
tractable. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the basic hypothesis. Section 3 develops the model. The 
information structure and the form of relative 
compensation contract as well as the investment 
strategy set have been described in that section. It also 
demonstrates and discusses the property of the solution. 
Section 4 is a numerical example. By using of the 
example, we conduct a sensitive analysis with regard to 
the main arguments in the model advanced in Section 3 
and categorize the equilibria in the managers’ subgame 
into three groups. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  BASIC HYPOTHESES 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to illustrate how 
investors can ensure the preferred investment policies 
must form a Nash equilibrium in the managers’ 
subgame by using of a relative performance contract. To 
focus on the problem and keep the analysis tractable, 
several hypotheses has to be made below. 
(H1) There are two independent funds, fund 1 and 2, 
which are delegated to fund manager 1 and 2 
respectively. The difference of the two managers in 
information gathering ability is insignificance. 
(H2) Investors who hold shares of a fund are treated 
as a representative investor. All the investors and 
managers exhibit the same preferences, described by the 
constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function 
for wealth ( ) ααWWU = for some α <1.The 
investors and managers have no disposable wealth other 
than the amounts they will receive from their funds at 
dissolution. 
(H3) There are only two assets available as 
investment opportunities, Q and M. The riskless asset M 
has a state-independent return rate Rm, while risky asset 
Q has a state-dependent return rate Rq. There exist just 
two equally likely natural status, which correspond to 
‘nice’ (N) and ‘coarse’ (C) environments for the risky 
investment opportunity. Without loss of generality, we 
normalize return rates so that the return on the riskless 
asset is zero, whereas the risky asset returns 1 in the 
event nice environment occurs and -1 in the event 
coarse environment takes place. Thus the return rate of 
the risky asset can be described as the following step 
function. 
 
( )
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1
1ωqR   C
N
∈
∈
ω
ω
                                        (1) 
If we denote by iδ ∈[0,1] the proportion of the 
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funds invested in the risky asset Q, then the return rate 
from a portfolio i in stateω may be expressed as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 1i i i q i m i qR R R Rω δ δ ω δ δ ω= + − = =
    
⎩⎨
⎧
−δ
δ
C
N
∈
∈
ω
ω
        (2) 
(H4) Fund managers carry on investment activities 
independently, they do not pool their information and 
there is no collusion. 
(H5) The sequence of actions of the investors and 
the managers may be outlined as follows: 
The two groups of investors simultaneously offer 
contracts to their respective managers.  
The managers simultaneously decide whether to 
accept or reject their respective offers. If a manager 
rejects the contract offered to him, then he can only earn 
his reservation utility U  from her outside 
opportunities.  
If a manager accepts the contract offered to him, he 
chooses first whether to gather information and then 
how to act upon his private information. Undertake 
information gathering activities requires a manager to 
expend a fixed effort e in terms of the manager’s 
disutility. 
Each manager makes a portfolio decision according 
to his information. 
Uncertainty is revealed, returns are realized, and the 
contracted payments to the managers are made.  
 
3.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL 
 
3.1 Information Structure 
Definition 1  Information reflects the nature status 
including social economic environment and fluctuation 
of security market that has an impact on return of risky 
assets is called a signal. 
 We will denote iτ as the status of the signal that 
manager i received. Throughout this paper, we will 
assume that there are just two kinds of signals a 
manager can obtain from his information-gathering 
activity, which correspond to a ‘good’ (G) signal and a 
‘bad’ (B) signal. A ‘good’ signal indicates that the 
natural status will be nice, so the risky assets will have a 
high return, vice versa, a ‘bad’ signal indicates that the 
natural status will be coarse, so the risky assets will have 
a low return. Let Gi and BBi express the case that the 
signal manager i obtained is a ‘good’ signal and a ‘bad’ 
signal respectively. 
Definition 2  If given a signal ‘good’, the posterior 
probability of the event that status N realizes is greater 
than the prior probability that status N occurs, or given a 
signal ‘bad’, the posterior probability of the event that 
status C realizes is greater than the prior probability that 
status C occurs, then we say the signal possesses 
information value. 
If the signal manager i obtained have information 
value, then 
( )iGNP ＞P(N) =1/2= P(C)＞ ( )iGCP  ( )iBCP ＞P(C) =1/2= P(N)＞ ( )iBNP . 
Definition 3  If the likelihoods of receiving a good 
signal and receiving a bad signal is equal, 
and ( )iGNP = ( )iBCP , then the signal is called a 
uniform signal. 
If both managers receive uniform signals, 
then ( )21GGNP = ( )21BBCP . 
Definition 4  If both managers receive uniform 
signals，the probability that the signals reflect the true 
status is called precision of a signal, which is denoted 
by θ = ( )21GGNP = ( )21BBCP . 
Definition 5  If signals the managers receive 
satisfy ( )12 GGP = ( )12 BBP , then the signals are 
called balanced signals.  
Definition 6  If two manager receive balanced 
signals，given a manager receives a signal of some kind, 
the conditional probability that the other manager 
receive the same kind of signal is called relevance of 
signals, denotes by ρ = ( )12 GGP = ( )12 BBP . If 
ρ greater than 1/2, we say the signal are correlated。  
Definition 7  If the joint probability distribution 
over each manager’s signal and the natural status 
satisfies 
P(N∩G1) = P(N∩G2)，P (N∩G1∩BB2) = P (N∩B1B
∩G2) 
P(C∩BB1) = P(C∩B2B )，P (C∩BB1∩G2) = P (C∩G1
∩B2B ) 
the signals are called symmetrical signals. 
Definition 8  If the signals each manager receives 
possesses information value, and the signals are 
uniform, symmetrical and correlated with each other, 
the signals are called effective signal. 
Theorem 1  If both managers receive effective 
signals, then the joint probability over the signals and 
natural status can be showed in table 1. 
[Insert table 1 about here ] 
Proof  From definition 2 and definition 3,  we have ( )iGNP = ( )iBCP ＞1/2 
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It follows that   θ = ( )21GGNP = ( )21BBCP ＞
1/2 
From definition 6,  ρ = ( )12 GGP = ( )12 BBP ＞
1/2 
Then according to definition 3, we derive 
P(N ∩ G1 ∩ G2) = P(G1) × ( )12 GGP ×( )21GGNP  = 2/ρθ = P(C∩BB1∩B2B  )        
P(N ∩ BB1 ∩ B2B ) = P(BB1) × ( )12 BBP ×( )21BBNP = 2/)1( θρ − = P(C∩G1∩G2)      
P(N∩G1∩BB2)+ P(N∩B1B ∩G2)+P(C∩BB1∩G2 )+ 
P(C∩G1∩B B )=1- ρ  
Then it is easily proved from definition 7 that 
P(N∩G1∩BB2)= P(N∩B1B ∩G2)= P(C∩BB1∩G2 ) = 
P(C∩G1∩B B ) = ( ) 4/1 ρ−  
 
3.2 Relative performance contract and 
investment strategy of managers 
Investors of both funds wish their managers to choose a 
δ that will maximize investors’ expected utility. 
unfortunately, the investor can neither observe the 
information gathering activity of his own manager, nor 
the δ the manager choose, let alone the other 
manager’s choice, the only thing he can observe is the 
return of fund managed by each manager, therefore the 
payment schedule can be only based on the returns of 
both funds. If the signals managers receive are 
correlated, it is worth to use relative performance 
contract. 
Theorem 2 Denote ( )jiii RRRf −，  as the fee 
contract offered by investors of fund i, W is his initial 
investment in the fund, the remuneration the investor 
paid to manager i can be described as 
( ),i i i jR R RΓ −  
=
( )
(⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⋅+−−
⋅−
Wf
Wf
jiii
jiii
δδδ
δδδ
,
,
)     CN∈∈ωω                     
(3) 
    
Prove  From equation (2) 
( ),i iR ω σ  
=     
⎩⎨
⎧
− i
i
δ
δ
C
N
∈
∈
ω
ω ， ( ) ( ), ,i i jR R
=     ⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ +−
−
ji
ji
δδ
δδ
C
N
∈
∈
ω
ω
  
Hence, ( )jiii RRRf −，  
=
( )
( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ +−−
−
jiii
jiii
f
f
δδδ
δδδ
,
,
C
N
∈
∈
ω    
ω
              (4) 
It is obviously that ( ),i i i jR R RΓ − = ( ),i i i jf R R R− W                  (5) 
Subsititute (5) into (4), it is immediately equation (3) 
holds. 
Denote ( )ii ηγ , ∈ [ ]1,0 × [  as the investment 
policy that manager i adopts, which means investing a 
portion
]1,0
iγ ( respectively, iη ) of the funds into the risky 
asset if the status of the signal received by manager i is 
good (respectively, bad). 
Given a relative performance contract ( )jiii RRRf −， , and given that the manager j is 
following the investment policy ( jγ , jη ), according to 
theorem 1 and 2, the expected utility of the manager i 
who adopts the investment policy ( iγ , iη ) will be 
denoted by 
( ) ( )( ), , ,Ai i i i j jU γ η γ ηΓ  
= ( ) ( )( )jjiiAii UGP ηγγ ,,Γ×  
+ ( ) ( )( )jjiiAii UBP ηγη ,,Γ×  
= ( )×iGP  
( ){ ij GCGP ( )( )jiiiAiU γγγ +−−Γ⋅ ,  
+ ( )ij GCBP ( )( )jiiiAiU ηγγ +−−Γ⋅ ,  
+ ( )ij GNGP ( )( )jiiiAiU γγγ −Γ⋅ ,  
+ ( )
ij
GNBP AiU⋅ ( )( )}jiii ηγγ −Γ⋅ ,  
( )
jω δ ω− δ  
+ P iB ×  
( ){ ij BCGP ( )( )jiiiAiU γηη +−−Γ⋅ ,  
+ ( )ij BCBP ( )( )jiiiAiU ηηη +−−Γ⋅ ,  
+ ( )ij BNGP ( )( )jiiiAiU γηη −Γ⋅ ,  
+ ( )ij BNBP ( )( )}jiiiAiU ηηη −Γ⋅ ,  
If the information structure described in section 3.1 
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present, the expected utility of the manager i can be 
transformed into the following expression, 
( )1 / 2ρ θ− ⋅ ( )( ),Ai i i i jU f Wγ γ γ− − +  
+ ( )1 / 4ρ− ⋅ ( )( ),Ai i i i jU f Wγ γ η− − +  
+ / 2ρθ ⋅ ( )( ),Ai i i i jU f Wγ γ γ−  
+ ( )1 / 4 AiU⋅ρ− ( )( ),i i i jf Wγ γ η−  
+ ( )1 / 4ρ− ⋅ ( )( ),Ai i i i jU f Wη η γ− − +  
+ 2/ρθ ( )( ),Ai i i i jU f Wη η η⋅ − − +  
+ ( )1 / 4 (ρ− )( ),Ai i i i jU f Wη η γ⋅ −  
+ ( )1 / 2ρ θ− ( )( ),Ai i i i jU f Wη η η⋅ −    (6) 
Under the information structure described in section 
3.1, it is obvious that both investors wish their 
respective managers to gather information, to invest all 
funds into the risky asset if the signal status is good, and 
to invest exclusively in the riskless asset if the signal 
‘bad’ realizes. In a word, the investment policy the 
investors prefer is (1, 0). 
When both manager can only choose δ ∈{0,1}, it 
can be seen from equation (2) that only 3 different 
return rate can be achieved, which are 1, 0 and -1. Thus 
there are only 7 possible different groups of return 
combination of two funds, which are (-1,0), (-1,-1), 
(1,0), (1,1), (0,1), (0,0), (0,-1). Therefore if investors of 
either fund include in the contract a provision that the 
manager will get a reward worse than the worst reward 
for the 7 return combinations mentioned above if other 
return combinations are observed, neither manager will 
choose a portfolio weight other than δ ∈{0,1}. 
However, since the natural status is unobservable, 
managers still have three kinds of strategies that deviate 
from the desired strategy to choose. Denote Sik (i=1,2; 
k=1,2,3,4) as the investment strategies the fund 
manager i adopts, the strategies are shown table 2. 
According to the table, Si1 is the desired strategy, Si2 is 
the reverse strategy of Si1. Both the strategies require 
managers to undertake information-gathering activities, 
and so to expand an effort e. In contrast, the last two 
strategies do not require manager to collect information, 
the managers actually invest exclusively in risky or 
riskless asset according to their prior belief, hence no 
effort is expend. 
[Insert table 2 about here ] 
 
3.3 The model 
If investors of both funds offer the relative 
performance contracts ( )jiii RRRf −，  described in 
3.2, and both signals the managers receive are effective 
signals, the problem facing the investor i can be 
described as 
 
 
( ),maxi i i j oif R R R EU−  
= ( ),maxi i i jf R R R P− ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ),1 1,0i j i oi i iG P CG G U R C f W⎡× ⋅ − −⎣  
+ ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )WfCRUGCBP iioiij 1,11, −−−⋅ + ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )WfNRUGNGP iioiij 0,11, −⋅  
+ ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )]WfNRUGNBP iioiij 1,11, −⋅ + ( )×iBP [ ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )WfCRUBCGP iioiij 1,00, −⋅  
+ ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )WfRUBBP iioiij 0,00, −⋅ ω + ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )]WfNRUBNGP iioiij 1,00, −−⋅  
s.t. 
  ( )11 , jiiAi SXSU ≥ eU +                                    （IR） 
  ( ) eSXSU jliiAi −,1 ≥ ( ) eSXSU jliiAi −,2   （l=1,2,3,4）      （IC1） ( ) eSXSU jliiAi −,1 ≥ ( )jliikAi SXSU , （k=3,4; l=1,2,3,4）      （IC2） 
 
(M) 
Where EUoi denotes the expected utility of investor i 
and under the information structure described in section 
3.1, EUoi can be reduced to the following expression, 
 ( ) ( )( )WfU ioi )0,1(12/1 −−−⋅−θρ  
+ ( ) ( )( )WfU ioi )1,1(14/1 −−−−⋅− ρ  
+ ( )( )WfU ioi )0,1(12/ −⋅ρθ  
+ ( ) ( )( )WfU ioi )1,1(14/1 −⋅− ρ  
+ ( ) ( )( )WfU ioi )1,0(14/1 −⋅− ρ  
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+ ( )WfU ioi )0,1(2/ −⋅ρ  
+ ( ) ( WfU ioi )1,0(4/1 )−−⋅− ρ            
(7) 
                 
The objective of the problem is to maximize the 
expected utility that investor i gain when both managers 
choose the desired strategies Si1. Individual rationality 
constraint (IR) ensure that manager i is willing to accept 
the contract offered to him. Incentive compatibility 
constraints (IC1) and (IC2) guarantee that manager i 
will have no incentive to deviate from the desired 
investment strategy Si1 whatever strategy the manager j 
implement, because he will gain the maximum expected 
utility with the adoption of Si1. As the structures of both 
contracts are identical and the preferences of investors 
and managers are all alike, the optimal contracts of both 
funds are the same. 
General properties of the solution are hard to 
demonstrate in theory, in this case we will discuss those 
properties by using of a numerical example in the next 
section, but there is one certain conclusion related to the 
optimal contract we can safely make below. 
Theorem 3  Strategy combination (S11, S21) must 
form a Nash equilibrium in the managers’ subgame that 
follows their simultaneous acceptance of their 
respective relative performance contracts. 
Prove  From (IC1) and (IC2), S11 will always be the 
(weak) dominant strategy over other strategies 
S1k(k=2,3,4) for manager 1 whatever strategy manager 2 
bring to effect, similarly, S21 must be the (weak) 
dominant strategy over other strategies S2l (l=2,3,4) for 
manager 2 whatever strategy manager 1 choose to put 
into execution. Therefore Strategy combination (S11, 
S21) must form a Nash equilibrium in the managers’ 
subgame that follows their simultaneous acceptance of 
their respective relative performance contracts. 
However, there is still another issue needs to be 
addressed that whether there are other strategy 
combinations for the two managers that form a Nash 
equilibrium in this subgame. We will discuss the 
problem in the next section. 
 
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
 
We have considered a wide range of parameter values to 
investigate some properties of the solution to model M. 
We choose a representative set of parameters to 
illustrate the relevant problems. The second column of 
table 3 presents numerically-determined values of the 
fee contracts fi (Ri, Ri-Rj), the respective payoff that the 
investors and the managers will gain when the desired 
strategies were chosen, which are implied by formula (6) 
and (7) for α =3/5, U =10, e=1, ρ =0.6, θ =0.7 and 
W=5000. 
 
4.1 Sensitivity analysis 
We have performed sensitivity analysis with respect to 
parameters ρ , θ  and W. The main results are shown in 
table 3. 
[Insert table 3 about here ] 
We summarize the results as follows, 
From the last line of table 3, it can be seen that the 
payoff that a investor gain when he chooses the desired 
strategy is slightly greater than or equal to reserved 
utility, which means the investor wish to pay as little as 
possible to his manager after the IR constraint is 
satisfied.  
It is generally regarded fair that the better 
performance result in higher compensation. From the 
point of view of fair, there should exist the following 
relationship among the fees, 
fi (1,1)＞fi (1,0)＞fi (-1,0)＞fi (-1,-1); 
fi (1,1)＞fi (0,1) fi (0,0)＞fi (0,-1)＞fi (-1,-1); 
fi (1,0)＞fi (0,0)＞fi (-1,0);  fi (1,0)＞fi (0,0)＞fi (0,-1); 
fi (0,1)＞fi (0,0)＞fi (-1,0); 
In our examples, the fees satisfy all above 
relationships except that fi(0,0)＜fi(-1,0). As a matter of 
fact, too large the fee fi (0,0) will encourage managers to 
evade responsibility and avoid the difficulty to collect 
information since by choosing strategy Si3, he will also 
gain a lot without any risk. It is therefore sensible to set 
fi (0,0) small. 
Compare column 2, 3 and 4, we find out that keep 
the relevance of signals ρ  and investment scale W 
fixed on the initial value, the higher the precision of a 
signalθ  is, the more expected utility and a investor will 
gain, the same is true of the utility gained per unit of 
asset However, change the value of θ  have few 
influence on the utility a manager will gain. It shows 
that the benefits from enhancement of precision of a 
signal are almost entirely occupied by the investor. 
Compare column 2, 5 and 6, we discover that hold 
θ  and W constant, the higher the relevance of signals ρ  is, the more expected utility a investor will gain, and 
so does the utility gained from per unit of asset. 
Nevertheless, the influence of relevance of signals is 
less than that of precision of a signal. It is obvious from 
table 3 that one percent gain in precision of a signal will 
60 percent increase in expected utility, whereas one 
percent gain in relevance of signals will result in 25% 
increase in expected utility. 
Compare column 2, 7and 8, we learn that hold ρ  
and θ  constant, the larger the investment scale is, the 
more expected utility a investor will gain, but unlike the 
above two cases, the utility gained from per unit of asset 
is decreasing in W. 
 44
Sun Jing/Canadian Social Science Vol.1 No.1 2005 39-47 
 
4.2 The choice of investment strategies 
made by managers 
According to theorem 3, Strategy combination (S11, S21) 
must form a Nash equilibrium in the managers’ 
subgame, but whether this strategy combination will 
come up depends on the payoffs the managers obtain 
from all possible strategy combinations. In this section 
we will analysis the managers’ subgame that follows 
their simultaneous acceptance of their respective 
relative performance contracts. 
The payoffs the managers obtain from any strategy 
combination can be computed by using of formula (6). 
In our example, the payoffs the managers obtain can be 
classified into three categories, which are category 1 
represented by scenario Ⅲ (including scenario Ⅲ and 
Ⅵ), category 2 represented by scenarioⅠ(including 
scenarioⅠ,Ⅱ,Ⅳ,Ⅴ) and category 3 represented by 
scenario Ⅶ. Table 4 to 6 in turn list the Payoff matrixes 
of managers under scenario Ⅲ,Ⅰand Ⅶ separately. 
[Insert table 4 about here ] 
As can be seen from table 4, S11 and S21 are the 
dominant strategies of manager 1 and 2 under scenario 
Ⅲ respectively, therefore (S11, S21)forms the unique 
dominant strategy equilibrium, which is also strong 
Nash equilibrium. On condition that the two managers 
are rational and do not collaborate, none of them would 
have the incentive to deviate from the equilibrium. But 
take a further look at table 4, we will find that both 
managers will obtain more payoff from strategy 
combination (S14, S24) than the equilibria payoff. It 
seems to us that if both managers agree on 
implementing the investment policy (1, 1), the situation 
is certain adverse to investors. The results of games 
under scenarios in category 1 are analogous to scenario 
Ⅲ. 
[Insert table 5 about here ] 
It is can be seen from table 5 that the results of 
games under scenarios in category 2 are similar to that 
of games under scenarios in category 1. Take the 
scenarioⅠas an example. Strictly speaking, (S11, S21) 
still constitute dominant strategy equilibrium, but unlike 
scenario Ⅲ, manager 1 is indifferent to payoffs gained 
from (S14, S24) and (S11, S24), at the same time, manager 
2 is indifferent to payoffs gained from (S14, S24) and (S14, 
S21). Thus if we ignore the remote difference, (S14, S24) 
can also form a Nash equilibrium. Since neither (S11, S21) 
nor (S14, S24) constitutes a strong Nash equilibrium, it is 
likely that a mixed strategy equilibrium appears, as is 
the case with category 3. 
[Insert table 6 about here ] 
As illustrated in table 6, there will be four Nash 
equilibria in the subgame of fund managers under 
scenarios in category 3, which are (S11, S21), (S11, S24), 
(S14, S21) and (S14, S24). Since there is no difference 
between S14 and S11 to manager 1, and there is no 
difference between S24 and S21 to manager 2, no 
dominant strategy equilibrium exists. It is possible that a 
mixed strategy constituted by combination of S14 and S11 
and that of S24与S21. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
With the development of Chinese mutual fund industry, 
trades made by funds have an increasing prominent 
influence on securities markets. It is natural for 
investors and regulatory institutions to focus on the 
problem of monitoring the behavior of managers who 
manipulate those trades. Fair and reasonable 
compensation contract is an effective means to control 
managers’ behavior and thus alleviate conflicts of 
interests between investors and fund managers. 
This paper has constructed a programming model 
used to solve the optimal relative performance contract. 
It can be proved that when the constraints of the model 
can be satisfied, the strategy combination that the 
investors wish to see must form a Nash equilibrium in 
the managers’ subgame. As can be seen from the 
numerical example, the intended equilibrium will 
always constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium 
unless the two managers simultaneously deviate from 
the contract-consistent behavior to increase their 
payoffs. The study provides a feasible scheme for 
rationalization of compensation for asset management. 
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Table 1   The joint probability over the signals and natural status 
(1) N (2) C 
ω  
1τ      2τ  
G2 B2 G2 B2
G1 2/ρθ  4/)1( ρ−  2/)1( θρ − 4/)1( ρ−  
B1 4/)1( ρ− 2/)1( θρ − 4/)1( ρ−  2/ρθ  
ρ ,θ ( ]1,21∈  
 
Table 2    Investment strategies of fund managers 
 Si1 Si2 Si3 Si4
iγ  1 0 0 1 
iη  0 1 0 1 
 
Table  3    The main results of the numerical example 
Scenario 
Parameter Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ ρ  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 
θ  0.7 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
W 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 10000 15000 
fi(-1,0) 0.0017 0.0012 0.0021 0.0021 0.0023 9.11E-05 -6.05E-09
fi(-1,-1) -0.0102 -0.0051 -0.0062 -0.0082 -0.0081 -0.0153 -0.0206 
fi(1,0) 0.0216 0.0188 0.0202 0.0202 0.0203 0.0168 0.0201 
fi(1,1) 0.025 0.0199 0.0239 0.0236 0.0222 0.0212 0.0219 
fi(0,1) 0.0198 0.0125 0.0213 0.0180 0.0170 0.0152 0.0146 
fi(0,-1) 3.02E-08 3.49E-08 -2.51E-08 -4.98E-11 -9.05E-12 -0.0016 -0.0019 
fi(0,0) 0.0009 0.0008 2.56 E-08 5.09 E-04 2.94 E-04 2.33E-08 -1.26E-03
max EUoi 28.2851 45.5885 63.0916 34.7337 41.0471 46.6588 62.621 
max EUoi /W 0.00566 0.00912 0.01262 0.00695 0.00821 0.00467 0.00418 
UAi-e 10.4453 10.0009 10.0006 10.1258 10.0001 10.0009 10.00 
 
Table 4        Payoff matrix of managers under scenario Ⅲ 
Fund manager 2  
 S21 S22 S23 S24
S11 10.001, 10.001 17.054, -1.531 8.190, 0.754 18.865, 9.715 
S12 -1.531, 17.054 5.238, 5.238 -1.993, 9.157 5.701, 15.136 
S13 0.754, 8.190 9.157, -1.993 0.008, 0.008 9.904, 8.189 
Fund 
Manager 
1 
S14 9.715, 18.865 15.136,5.701 8.189, 9.904 16.662, 16.662 
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Table 5            Payoff matrix of managers under scenarioⅠ 
Fund manager 2  
 S21 S22 S23 S24
S11 10.445, 10.445 13.452, 4.567 7.028, 7.001 16.870, 10.011 
S12 4.567, 13.452 7.862, 7.862 1.293, 10.152 11.136, 13.163 
S13 7.001, 7.028 10.151, 1.293 4.016, 4.016 13.137, 6.305 
Fund 
Manager 
1 
S14 10.011, 16.870 13.163, 11.136 6.305, 13.137 16.869, 16.869 
 
Table 6          Payoff matrix of managers under scenario Ⅶ 
Fund manager 2  
 S21 S22 S23 S24
S11 10, 10 16.566, -2.711 0.968, -0.711 25.598, 10
S12 -2.711, 16.566 3.855, 3.855 -11.743, 5.855 12.887, 16.566
S13 -0.711, 0.968 5.855, -11.743 -9.743, -9.743 14.887, 0.968
Fund 
Manager 
1 
S14 10, 25.6 16.566, 12.89 0.968, 14.89 25.598, 25.598
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